International Crisis Group Releases New Reports on Horn Countries

The Brussels-based International Crisis Group has recently published two reports on countries in the Horn. The first, released August 12, is Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland, and the second, which came out today, is Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents.

South-central Somalia has been struggling against an Islamic insurgency since the beginning of May, while the two semi-autonomous regions to the north, Somaliland and Puntland, have been working to build viable local governments. Somaliland has struggled to ensure democracy and security, while Puntland has had its own share of security-related issues, most notably the issues of piracy.

The report targets several key areas that have been facing a downward trend in recent years, including: poor governance, internal security and intra-clan cohesion (the Darood clan being the most prominent in this area of the country). These issues are compounded by the high rates of unemployment and low levels of income.

Ethiopia, while it has experienced its fair share of internal and external security threats, faces a different challenge with democratic consolidation and free expression of minority ethnic groups. Home to over eighty different ethnicities, the country adopted a very progressive and liberal constitution based on a strong federalist power structure with eight, ethically diverse states and two city-states. The constitution also provides political space for minorities, allowing ethnic groups that feel underrepresented or oppressed to petition the government for secession.

Next year the country will hold presidential and parliamentary elections. But despite its rhetoric, the governing Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Demcratic Front (EPRDF) led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has been less forthcoming in its advancement of democracy than most ruling politicians would admit.

Since the 2005 elections, when almost 200 protesters were killed and thousands more arrested, the government has increasingly centralized authority in the hands of Zenawi. In January, Ethiopia's parliament adopted a highly criticized law on high rights groups that banned the work of organizations who received a large percentage of their funds from abroad.

Not only do these reports provide an excellent source for analysis on the current debates and issues arising in both these countries (or semi-autonomous region, as is the case in Puntland), but they also give succinct background information on their political histories.

AU Summit on Peace and Security Overshadowed by Kadhafi Celebrations

With Muammar Kadhafi celebrating his 40th year as the leader of Libya this week, little attention has been given to the African Union (AU) summit that was held in Tripoli on Monday. The summit, organized by Kadhafi earlier this summer, addressed the resolution of armed conflicts in Somalia, Sudan and the Great Lakes Region as well as the potential renewal of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. But the event was widely seen as an attempt to attract African heads of state to the country for Kadhafi’s week long festival.

At the end of the two-day summit, members of the AU agreed to the “Tripoli Declaration,” a statement detailing continued investment and concern for countries plagued by violence.

The biggest change in policy from this declaration addressed the AU’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Showing strong support for the Transitional Federal Government led by Prime Minister Sheik Sharif Ahmed member nations – particularly Sierra Leone, Malawi and Nigeria – agreed to double the number of troops for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), raising the level of troops to 8,000. In recent months, garnering support for AMISOM has been difficult. Despite this achievement, no date has been set for the deployment of these additional forces.

Sudan’s Darfur conflict was also on the table Monday as former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki reported his commission’s findings. The eight-member panel was commissioned to provide the AU with an "in-depth assessment of the situation in Darfur." Mbeki suggested a truth and reconciliation commission for Sudan, similar to that of South Africa, to bring Darfur war criminals to justice.

Since Khadafi was given the chairmanship of the African Union, he has advanced several harebrained schemes for the future continent and for himself. In April, he announced a plan to establish the “United States of Africa,” supposedly under his leadership. And most recently, he negotiated an oil-for-terrorist deal with Prime Minister Gordon Brown to release the bomber of the PanAm 103 flight over Lockerbie, Scotland. This summit, ostensibly on peace and security, has now been overshadowed by the lavish festivities around the 40th anniversary of the September 1, 1969 Libyan revolution.

If Khadafi does plan to improve peace and security on the continent, he must put rhetoric into action and set a timeline for strengthening AMISOM forces and developing truth commissions in Sudan. Without moving forward on these initiatives, Kadhafi’s vision of 2010 being the labeled the year of Peace and Security in Africa will be just another show.

Who is Al-Shabaab?

Al-Shabaab (or “the youth”) is the most significant terrorist threat against the United States in the Horn of Africa. The group threatens stability in Somalia and weakens the legitimacy of the transitional government. In recent years it has emerged as the strongest militant Islamist group in the country.

Started by Aden Hasi Ayro it was originally the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), who took control of the government in the summer of 2006. American cruise missiles killed Ayro in May 2008. Shiekh Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman assumed Ayro’s position as top commander. Mukhtar Robow became the organization’s spokesman and leader of Al-Shabaab affiliates in the Bay and Bakool regions of south-central Somalia.

Extremist Ideology

Al-Shabaab parted with moderate members of the ICU over a dispute regarding the implementation of Islamic law. It promotes a much stricter form of sharia law than the ICU introduced when it came to power. In areas of southern Somalia under their control, Al-Shabaab leaders have banned the popular narcotic khat and closed movie cinemas. They have also been flogging women in public, attacking humanitarian workers and civil society members and assassinating Somali politicians and police forces.

The organization’s activities thus far have been limited to within the borders of Somalia. Although it covets Al-Qaeda's ideology, Al-Shabaab's cause is more nationalist than internationalist. Its main target is the Somali government.

Expansion

During the Ethiopian occupation, Al-Shabaab fought as liberators and gained significant support from the Somali population. Anti-Ethiopian and anti-American sentiments grew. Thus, the group expanded rapidly, with hundreds of recruits “graduating” from their training camps annually. 

According to U.S. intelligence analysts, new recruits continue to join because they seek an Islamic republic, not because they want to join the global terrorist network. Instead, they are joining a nationalist organization.

Recruits have included both Americans and Europeans that train alongside Somalis. One video released in earlier this month shows an American leading a group of fighters in the bush outside Mogadishu. One American, Shirwa Ahmed, killed 29 people in a suicide bombing last October. 

Known Associations

Al-Shabaab is also affiliated with other Islamist groups in Somalia. Two of Ayro and Robow’s close associates, Hassan Turki and Hassan Dahir Aweys, led Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI), a violent Wahhabist organization that sought to spread Islamic rule throughout Somalia during the 1990s and early 2000s. Turki has close ties with Al-Shabaab, but is not considered a member of the organization. Aweys leads the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia-Asmara (ARS-A) and receives financial support from Eritrea.

Ayro and Robow have personal ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The two leaders trained in Afghanistan during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the group is ideological connected with al-Qaeda. The west, specifically the United States, is the primary source of contestation, corrupting the purity of Islam. All foreign occupiers, including the Ethiopians and the African Union, and the apostate moderates in the TFG, are seen as pawns of the west. 

The bond between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab has grown close in the past year. In March 2009, the Defense Intelligence Agency predicted that a formal agreement between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda is “forthcoming.”

Popular Support Waning?
The United States' ability to deter the growth of Al-Shabaab is weak. However, several signs indicate that al-Shabaab’s support might be waning.[1] First, the organization has lacked a strong foreign occupier to direct the attacks of its jihad since the Ethiopian withdrawal in December 2008. AMISOM is not attempting to fight the insurgency like the Ethiopians did; instead, its mission is to conduct a peace support operation and establish a level of security in the absence a domestic military force.[2] This calls into question al-Shabaab’s claim that they continue to free Somalis from foreign occupiers. 

Second, Islam in Somalia is relatively moderate and peaceful, with the exception of al-Shabaab. Many Somalis reject the style of rule that al-Shabaab has introduced in various towns and cities. In March 2009, popular protests against al-Shabaab’s strict laws on khat drew thousands of citizens from Kismayo and Baidoa into the streets.[3] Finally, the Somali population has negatively viewed the rise the brutal tactics adopted by al-Shabaab fighters. Kidnappings, assassinations and suicide bombs against humanitarian agencies, peace activists and businessmen have become very common.

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[1] Ken Menkhaus provides a good analysis of the al-Shabaab’s future and questions the foundation of their support among the Somali population in “Somalia After the Ethiopian Occupation: First steps to end the conflict and combat extremism,” The Enough Project, February 2009.

[2] AMISOM Mission Statement, AMISOM website http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/amisom.htm, accessed 6 April 2009.

[3] Mohamed Ahmed and Abdi Guled, “Somalis protest against al Shabaab, Kenyans taken,” Reuters, 25 March 2009.

In Somalia, Lawlessness on Land Leads to Lawlessness on the Seas

Somali pirates are in the news once again, capturing six shipping vessels in the Indian Ocean this week.  That is a total of 66 vessels on the year, with 16 still in the pirates hands.

This is particularly alarming for two reasons. One of the boats, the Maersk Alabama, is American owned and operated, and an American captain has been taken as ransom. It also illustrates that a few cavalier pirates have been able to outmaneuver a large international force of naval warships.

General David Petraeus announced the addition of more American warships on Thursday, sayinging  “we want to ensure that we have all the capability that might be needed over the course of the coming days.”  

Petraeus’ recent reaction to rescue Captain Richard Phillips is indicative of much greater problems facing U.S. policy toward Somalia. Additional warships to police the waters off the coast of Somalia do little to change the anarchistic environment that allows piracy to thrive.

When confronted with pirates off the coast of West Africa in 1841, British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston said, “Taking a wasps' nest...is more effective than catching the wasps one by one.”

The U.S. must seek out the wasps’ nest. Finding security in Somalia is the key to finding a solution to the world’s piracy problem. War has long plagued the country for 18 years. And now, extreme lawlessness on land has led to lawlessness on the seas. The United States should engage Somalia and seek political solutions in order to mitigate piracy over the long-term.

There are three ways to engage Somalia. First, the U.S. should open dialogue with moderate Muslims in the new government. Second, it should re-evaluate its policy of counterterrorism. And finally, it should reach out to the Somali people to counter the spread of radicalism.

The U.S. has long refrained from engaging moderate Muslims in Somalia. In 2006, President Ahmed was head of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government. At the time, it was ruled by the Islamic Courts Union, a religiously-motivated political party that sought to introduce sharia law. The U.S. supported an Ethiopian invasion in December 2006, and Muslim leaders fled to Eritrea. When Sheikh Ahmed returned to join the government in December 2008, former Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Fraiser denounced his bid for the presidency.

The Obama administration should extend a hand to the new president. Some in the administration are skeptical of his plans to negotiate with extremists like al Shabaab, a terrorist organization that controls most of southern Somalia. But President Ahmed has support from moderate Muslims. He may be the only hope to restore order in a country that has witnessed 18 years of anarchy.

U.S. counterterrorism policy has been counterproductive. It is weakening the legitimacy of the government and spreads anti-Americanism. Pinpointed tomahawk missile attacks on terrorist targets have led to further unrest and political instability. The U.S. has been empowering local warlords to help find these targets, which has been taking power from the central government.

After the U.S. killed al Shabaab’s leader, Aden Hasi Ayro, in May 2008 from a naval ship off the coast of Somalia, attacks on humanitarian aid agencies and civil society organizations increased. Public support for al Shabaab also increased.

To reverse the wave of anti-Americanism, the U.S. should use public diplomacy. U.S. counterterrorism policy and support for the Ethiopian invasion stirred anti-American sentiments among the local population. The U.S. can counter these and more radical sentiments by developing Somali radio programs to target towns controlled by al Shabaab. There are more than 200,000 Somali refugees in the U.S. that can run these programs. Instead of launching cruise missiles, the U.S. can launch radio waves.

Today, Somalia remains ungoverned and uncontrolled. Piracy has decreased in the past few months due to the international coalition. But this coalition of warships has done little to change the lawless environment where piracy to thrives -- Somalia.

The U.S. can do its part by changing past policies, but it must seek out the wasps’ nest. Then, there will be a safe passage for ships through the Gulf of Aden. 

Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army – An Impediment to Peace in a Volatile Region

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been fighting a guerrilla war against the government of Uganda since Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986. Led by Joseph Kony, the resistance movement follows a “cultish” ideology based on Christian “mysticism” and gains new recruits through kidnapping children, both male and female. It indoctrinates them as combatants, and preys on local populations for food, money and support. The LRA has been known as the worst human rights-abusing insurgencies ever and has been accused of cutting off the ears, noses, lips and limbs of its victims.

The government of Uganda has followed a two-track approach to pressure the LRA into a peace agreement. The first track is through peace talks. The Juba peace process began in 2006 and has led to the agreement of 5 sign protocols to end the 23 year-old conflict, according to the International Crisis Group. But Kony skipped the last round of talks in April 2008 and the LRA started a new offensive in the region during Christmas last year.

The second track the government has used to pressure the LRA to lay down their arms involves a military approach. Since the late 1980s, the Ugandan Peoples’ Defense Force (UPDF) has been active in Northern Uganda, where the LRA was founded. It has rooted out many of mid-level LRA operatives. High-level operatives have fled to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to rebuild and regroup. The Enough Project, a human rights advocacy group that focuses on Africa, issued a report in May 2009 that Kony may have relocated to the Central African Republic, with many of the LRA bases now along the border between the DRC and Sudan.

Recent Developments – A Wider Regional Crisis
Since the government of Sudan, the primary supporter of the LRA in the 1990s, made peace with rebel groups in south Sudan in the early 2000s, Uganda has been effective in dismantling LRA operations inside the country. But the LRA’s recent offensive last Christmas indicates that the group has reformed and is now focusing its attacks on Congolese and Sudanese targets. It seems the UPDF’s operations have led to the exportation of violence throughout the region.

After the string of attacks in Congo and Sudan last December, the Congolese government invited the UPDF into the country to disarm the LRA through a joint military operation. In recent decades, eastern DRC has been a notorious safe haven for insurgent rebel armies from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. And the LRA is no exception. It has been highly successful in dodging the most recent coordinated military operation. One humanitarian working in southern Sudan concluded, “They’re the world’s best bush guerrillas.”

The LRA is in a unique position to destabilize an already weak region. The United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) has been working with the Congolese government since 2005 to disarm rogue militias in eastern Congo, and the Congolese and Rwandan governments have recently coordinated a military operation to rid the region of several Tutsi and Hutu rebel armies that were terrorizing the local population. But the LRA has already shown its unique ability to survive counterinsurgency operations while still maintaining a core base of support.

Additionally, the LRA might destabilize the peace process in Sudan. There is fear among some analysts, most recently expressed by John Prendergast during a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month, that the Sudanese government may use the LRA to disrupt security arrangements in southern Sudan leading up to the elections.

The Debate Over Prosecution vs. Amnesty
Last month Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni promised amnesty to several senior commanders of the movement (including Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, who have both been indicted by the International Criminal Court) if they return to the peace process and agree to stop spreading violence.

President Museveni’s offer of amnesty to leading members of the LRA stirs a hotly contested debate within the literature about amnesty over prosecution. Issaka Souare presents both sides of the argument in a paper published last year in African Security Review. He argues that success in the Juba peace process can be achieved by finding a compromise between these two opposing camps.

The camp that favors prosecution provides three arguments. First, they believe that amnesty laws are incompatible with international laws. Second, they say that amnesty is not morally justifiable. And the last argument claims that amnesty does not offer guarantees that the peace will be sustained.

The camp in favor of amnesty laws provides two central arguments. They first believe that the pursuit of prosecution should not constrain the peace process. Second, the Rome Statute allows for amnesty when peace might be compromised.

Souare observes,

The debate presented above revolves around two central and equally valid preoccupations: The first is ending the two-decade-long armed conflict in Uganda so as to prevent further killings, human rights violations and destruction of property; and second to combat impunity so as to ensure that those responsible for past violations do not feel protected by the cover of an amnesty and commit more atrocities in the future.

He proposes a solution that blends these two camps and redefines the meaning of justice. Since the LRA has refused to return to the negotiating table until the ICC indictments against them are removed, Souare believes that justice and amnesty “are not mutually exclusive.” Uganda can provide amnesty to LRA commanders while also seeking justice using local justice mechanisms. By justice, Souare defines it in terms of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights.

This approach is attractive and does present a unique solution, but the LRA has redirected its targets from the Ugandan civilian population to towns and villages in Congo and Sudan. A local justice mechanism in Uganda will not be able to restore violated rights in Congo and Sudan. A wider regional approach will be required before an end to this conflict appears.


Sources

Greenwald, Jon. “Uganda: ‘Laying Ghosts and Making Peace’.” allAfrica, 18 December 2008.
International Crisis Group. Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace, With or Without Kony. 10 December 2008.

“CrisisWatch: Uganda.” Website accessed 23 March 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm? action=cw_search&l=1&t=1&cw_country=111&cw_date=.
Plaut, Marin. “Behind the LRA’s terror tactics.” BBC News, 17 February 2009.
Prendergast, John. Statement of Enough Project Co-chair to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Congress, 12 February 2009.
Spiegel, Julia and John Prendergast. A New Peace Strategy for Northern Uganda and the LRA. ENOUGH Strategy Paper 19 (May 2008).
Souare, Issaka K. “Moving the Uganda peace process from the dichotomy of criminal trials vs amnesty,” African Security Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2008).

Creation of Powersharing Government in Kenya: Promises and False Hopes Lead to Severe Challenges

On December 27, 2007, 82% of Kenya’s eligible voters went to the polls for the country’s fourth multi-party election. Analysts, observers, stakeholders and citizens all knew the election would be close. The Electoral Commission of Kenya reported President Mwai Kibaki the winner by a slim margin. The opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, claimed that he won the election. The election was not free and fair. Several election-monitoring organizations reported serious allegations of voting irregularities and vote buying. As a result, violence broke out and nearly 1,000 Kenyans were killed, with more than 350,000 people displaced. Luos, Odinga’s ethnic group, took to the streets to protest and attack people they felt were responsible for the vote rigging – the Kikuyus – President Kibaki’s ethnic group.

Five years of democratic reform hit a standstill as the two former political allies, President Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and Odinga of the Orange Democracy Movement (ODM), butted heads. Some analysts allege that the election was an “ethnic census”, pinning Kikuyus against Luos. Fear spread throughout the international community that ethnic civil war would soon break out. The country needed a negotiated settlement in order to quell the violence.

Finding a Solution

The negotiation process in Kenya began in late January. President Kibaki and opposition leader Odinga understood the gravity of the deteriorating political situation, and sought to reach a settlement. I. William Zartman, a scholar on negotiation processes, argues that mediation in political and armed conflicts typically begins when both parties have reached a point that they no longer want to continue fighting. This is known as a “mutually hurting stalemate,” and Zartman believes this is precisely the exact moment when the conflict “ripens” or presents itself to third parties for mediation.

Additionally the international community expressed deep interest in the political violence that spread throughout the country. Former president of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa was already present in Kenya for an election-monitoring mission with the Commonwealth Group. When the conflict began, he decided to stay, and he played a crucial role in contacting the group of African mediators known as the “Panel of Eminent African Personalities”. Former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan and former First Lady of South Africa and wife of Nelson Mandela, Graca Machel, arrived on January 22nd to direct negotiations between the government and ODM.

By the time Annan and Machel arrived, the country had already been torn apart. Rival politicians Martha Karua of the NARC and William Ruto of the ODM stoked the flames of ethnic competition. In speeches before and after the election, both politicians addressed ethnic advancement as the primary concern for winning.

One month of fighting resulted in a strongly divided political culture at the national level. Ethnic divisions between the Kikuyus and the Luos destroyed once peaceful towns and villages. Kisumu and Eldoret witnessed the worst cases of post-election ethnic violence and ethnic cleansing. In Eldoret, Kalenjin youth, part of the ODM coalition, set ablaze dozens of Kikuyus seeking shelter in a church.

Ending the violence and creating a legitimate government were the primary security concerns for the mediators. All parties, including the Kibaki and Odinga camps believed that agreement on a new government would immediately put a stop to the violence. Therefore, the negotiation talks concentrated on building an acceptable government.

Kofi Annan announced the agreement of a power-sharing government on February 27, 2008 and the Kenyan parliament adopted it on March 18th. Mr. Odinga became the prime minister, and the ODM and NARC would share forty cabinet seats.

Future Challenges

The creation of a new power-sharing government does not alone erase the hardened ethnic divisions that surfaced in January 2008, immediately following the election. The country’s deep-rooted security concerns are a serious hindrance to the future prospects of peace. One year after the two political parties signed the agreement, progress for peace has been limited. Below is a list of three main challenges that the new government still faces.

First, a return to ethnic violence is the primary security concern. As Scott Baldauf of Christian Science Monitor reports, “Hundreds of thousands of displaced people have been forced out of relief camps to return home, without any attempt to ensure that mutually suspicious communities don’t fight again.” Ethnic tensions may have simmered for now, but Kikuyus, living among Luos, might seek ethnic reprisal in the future.

Second the government must overcome the current political stalemate. As often happens in power-sharing governments, political divisions impede progress. The 2008 power-sharing agreement called for the new government to write a new constitution. This has yet to happen.

According to International Crisis Group Vice President Francois Grignon, “Kofi Annan has bought us three years of surface stability, without putting in structures for implementation. There were achievements. The violence stopped. The government was formed. You have a prime minister and the setup is working, and although sometimes painful to watch, you see a willingness to make it work. But the politicians, they need to show that they are making progress.” Or else, there will undoubtedly be a return to violence.

Finally, corruption remains a serious challenge to government legitimacy. Corruption has been a major challenge facing the country even before the 2007 elections. It is a challenge that most Kenyan politicians have decided not to address because many thrive in the environment of corruption that plagues the country.

Meanwhile, its citizens suffer. And the government’s legitimacy suffers. “Some 10 million Kenyans are at risk of starvation because government officials ignored warnings of a looming food storage, and in face sold some of Kenya’s food stocks to neighboring Sudan,” Baldauf reported.

These challenges will not go away in the near future. The nascent Kenyan government must address these issues before the next election cycle or the world will witness another disastrous breakdown of stability.

Somalia Instability Increases Concern for U.S. Counterterrorism Policy on the Homefront

Over the past few weeks, local and national newspapers have been increasingly interested in the growth of radicalization in Muslim-American communities, in particular Somali-American communities that still maintain close relations with friends and family in Somalia. This is due to FBI and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) warnings that Islamic radicalization is spreading throughout the U.S.

In response to increase concern over possible terrorist incursion within the U.S. borders, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a hearing Wednesday on the recent recruitment of Somali-Americans in cities throughout the United States.

At the hearing, leading scholar on Somalia issues, Ken Menkhaus, addressed the importance of the Al-Shabaab to American interests.

“The principal reason for US concern about shabaab is not that it is a violent,extremist armed insurgency which employs tactics that could legitimately be described as “terrorist” in nature…Shabaab stands out because of its ties to al Qa’ida. Shabaab spokesperson Sheikh Robow (aka Abu Mansur) publicly and defiantly underscored this link to al Qa’ida in 2008, and top al Qa’ida figures have made global appeals to help shabaab in a jihad against Ethiopia.”

Authorities are concerned that Somali-Americans, who hold U.S. passports and are easily able to travel abroad, might build relationships with members of the Shabaab, and likewise, Al-Qaeda. They can then return to the U.S. using government-issued passport and establish networks inside the U.S. border. In a talk at CSIS on counterterrorism strategies Juan Zarate, former deputy national security advisor for combating terrorism, said Wednesday that NCTC received a credible threat from Al-Shabaab on Inauguration Day.

While the administration’s focus has veered towards the ungoverned border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Somalia remains on the periphery of U.S. counterradicalization efforts. Now, extremists in Somalia are jeopardizing previous successes in counterradicalization efforts in the home front. But, authorities claim, the level of radicalization in the U.S. still remains well below that seen in disenfranchised Muslim communities in Europe.

U.S. counterradicalization policy in on the home front has centered on detection and investigation techniques by the FBI and the NCTC. In his testimony, NCTC Deputy Director Andrew Liepman outlined the current U.S. counterradicalization strategy toward Somali-American communities:

“To coordinate Federal, State, and local engagement efforts within
Somali-American communities, the NCTC Global Engagement Group chairs the Somali Community Outreach Forum…This working group provides a forum to coordinate community outreach meetings in Columbus, Ohio and Minneapolis, Minnesota and other venues, and serves as a central point for collaboration that is designed to increase the effectiveness and coordination of activities, while respecting the civil liberties and privacy rights of US Persons.”

The Somali-American community ranges from 150,000-200,000 people and can be found in Minneapolis, Columbus and Seattle. An important issue that must be addressed when approaching this community is cultural sensitivity. Using local law, state and federal law enforcement mechanisms can lead to disenfranchising the local population.

One approach that has been effective in the Netherlands for opening dialogue with its immigrant communities is establishment of “information houses.” The information houses provide members of the community a location to confidentially express their concerns local law enforcement bodies about other members of the community that might be leaning toward radicalism and extremism.

Somalia is a failed state and has not been able to establish a powerful government since 1991. Since the Siad Barre regime collapse Mogadishu has been under control of several different factions. More recently in 2006, it was held by the Islamic Courts Union who attempted to introduce Sharia law when the Ethiopian army invaded in December of that year to establish a pro-West government.

In January, the country’s parliament chose a new president, Sheik Sharif Ahmed, former leader of the Islamic Courts Union. The BBC reported this week that the government is considering adopting a new system of laws based on Sharia.

In addition to Menkhaus’ testimony, the committee also listened to the assistant director of the FBI’s National Security Branch Phillip Mudd, the deputy director for intelligence at the NCTC, Andrew Liepman, and two representatives from the Somali-American community in Minnesota, Abdirahman Mukhtar and Osman Ahman.


Articles on Radicalization in the U.S.
AP: http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gq7vAcxN1EnWq0Cdj-H5PF6oM9KQD96RDTU00
Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/10/AR2009031003901_pf.html
Bloomberg News: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=akGM0Du6ZUc0&refer=us

Senate Homeland Security Committee Website on Somali-American Hearing (March 11, 2009) – This site has video, audio and pdfs of the recent hearing. http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=35e68562-1606-409a-9118-3edfbb8e87c8

Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference on Somalia (March 10, 2009) – This site has video and audio of a recent conference on Somalia at CSIS.
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_events/task,view/id,1933/

Sudan is Heating Up -- Al-Turabi Released from Prison, Bashir on Speaking Tour and UN Troops Attacked

In the week following the ICC’s arrest warrant for President Bashir Sudan has seen a flurry of activity. Three days of protests in Khartoum rejected the ICC’s decision; Muslim opposition leader Hassan al-Turabi has been released from prison following his arrest in January; and President Bashir has decided to go "on tour" around the country to decry the ruling by the world's highest court. Meanwhile, the U.S. embassy has allowed non-essential staff to voluntarily evacuate and UNAMID is reporting increased attacks against peacekeeping troops.

What does this mean?

Over the next few weeks we should expect to see increased activity in the country. Many analysts fear that the attack against the UN-AU peacekeepers in Western Darfur may be an indication of what is to come. Furthermore, the Sudan Poeple's Liberation Movement has been relatively quiet since the warrant and vice-president Siir has cancelled his trip to Tokoyo, where he was going to discuss security issues in Africa.

While opposition parties have been relatively quiet, political instability is beginning to enter the public arena. Significant tensions are beginning to mount between different factions of the Muslim north, and this was enhanced by the release of the Popular Congress Party leader al-Turabi, the government’s harshest critic.

Earlier this year, al-Turabi was thrown in jail for his insistence that President Bashir is “politically culpable” for the deaths in Darfur. Once an ardent supporter of fundamentalist Islam and and a close ally of President Bashir, al-Turabi was responsible for inviting Osama bin Laden to Sudan in the earlier 1990s. But al-Turabi split with the president in 1999 and is now an advocate for democratic principles and human rights.

Since his release from prison, al-Turabi has continued to criticize the president, saying in an interview with the BBC,

"My position on international justice is firm and principled. It is possible to say that this position is stronger with regard to bringing justice and spreading the authority of the court which is more important than the power of the UN Security Council (UNSC)."

Asked whether he thought the government would throw him back in jail if he continued his criticism, Al-Turabi responded, "You can't predict what they will do because they don't think logically. They may do it. They may not."

New York Times correspondent Lydia Polgreen believes that the release was an indication that the government is willing to appease the nation’s political parties in order to “resolv[e] some of the nation’s internal political divisions given the threat of arrest facing Mr. Bashir.”

But Omama al-Turabi, Mr. Turabi’s daughter, said in the Sudan Tribune that the government’s decision to release her father was not politically motivated. It was a response to the family’s concerns for al-Turabi’s health. “On our last visit he [Turabi] told us that he had severe cold and after the physician inspected him it was found that his blood pressure has skyrocketed,” she said. Omama rejected any notion that the government had made a deal or bargain with Al-Turabi.

For articles on Al-Turabi’s release, see:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7931769.stm
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-turabi-qa10-2009mar10,0,8183.story?page=1
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/world/africa/10sudan.html?_r=1&ref=world
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30439

For articles on Bashir’s speaking tour, see: http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-sudanbashir9-2009mar09,0,2597541.story

For articles on the attack of UNAMID peacekeepers, see:
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLA133134
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30448

Article I Wrote for International Affairs Review (www.iar-gwu.org) - Somalia

Below is an article I wrote for International Affairs Review in December on the future of Somalia. It is based on a briefing I attended that was given by Ken Menkhaus.

Somalia - Where Does it go From Here? Three Possible Scenarios

By James Turitto, IAR Staff Writer.

The future of Somalia hangs by a thread. Ethiopia, which failed to bring stability to the country, recently announced a withdraw of it’s military by the end of the year. And one scholar on Somalia, Ken Menkhaus, predicts a continuation of violence for years to come.

In a discussion last week at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC, Menkhaus outlined three possible scenarios for Somalia’s future. Unfortunately, for the country’s citizens, none of these scenarios is without continued fighting, he said.

The first scenario, deemed the “best case scenario” by Menkhaus, would be a successful implementation of the Djibouti Agreement. The agreement was forged in the summer of 2008 between the opposition Islamist faction, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), and the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which has struggled to control the country since it was formed in 2004.

This agreement marked the first time in Somalia’s history where two warring parties were able to negotiate a common path forward.

An additional accord to the Djibouti Agreement was reached last month. The two opposing factions negotiated the formation of a unity government by expanding the size of Parliament to 550 members, from 275.

This agreement, however, does not look like it will succeed. Menkhaus blames the possible failure on two spoilers: Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf and the Somali Al-Shabaab movement – a radical, Islamic youth group with close ties to Al-Qaeda. The President “refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Djibouti Accord signed by the Prime Minister. He says it does apply to him,” Menkhaus added.

The second scenario, which is “the most likely case”, would be a continuation of the current state of affairs. Or better yet, a return to pre-2006 Somalia when fighting was limited and there was relative stability. Although the TFG did not have control outside the capital of Mogadishu, most of the cities and villages were run by clan-based fiefdoms, with village elders as the acting authority.

Finally, in the third, or “worst case scenario”, Somalia would fall under the control of Al-Shabaab. This group seeks to establish a state based on Sharia law, and administer the country similar to the Taliban’s style in Afghanistan. While the Al-Shabaab has not proven to be extremely strong, it has recently been filling a power vacuum left by the weakened TFG, claimed Menkhaus.

The Al-Shabaab is not like its predecessor, the Union of Islamic Courts, which controlled Somalia briefly in early 2007. It has gained control of the port city Kismayo and instituted strict Islamic law. Last week, the organization beheaded six members of civil society. There have also been reports of women being stoned.

In early 2008 the US State Department declared Al-Shabaab a terrorist organization, and in May a US airstrike killed the group’s leader, Adan Hashi Ayro. Since the airstrike Al-Shabaab has begun targeting all westerners, all UN affiliates, and all Somalis in the region who work with the US, Menkhaus said.

Because of these new developments, civil society and humanitarian workers are leaving the country in droves, fleeing to Kenya for their safety. “The country is being gutted of the very group of people that it most needs if it’s going to see a solution,” Menkhaus continued.

Instability in Somalia is not new. The country has been in a state of anarchy since 1991 when Ethiopian-backed insurgents overthrew the government of Siad Barre. Fighting has continued to this day, and the country has been without a strong central government for nearly 20 years.

To put this in perspective, Menkhaus said, no Somali below the age of 25 has lived under control of a central government, nor do they understand the concept of statehood.

The situation has become a “perfect storm” of humanitarian disasters. Somalia is experiencing a severe drought, and food prices continue to soar due to insecurity in the country and a global food shortage. One million people living in southern Somalia are internally displaced and three million more need emergency aid. In an area with only six million people, these numbers are frightening.

Sudanese President Bashir Indicted by the ICC

Today, a panel of judges from the International Criminal Court (ICC) passed down an indictment to President Omar al-Bashir on five charges of crimes against humanity and two charges of war crimes. The judges refrained from charging Mr. Bashir directly with genocide.

There is widespread concern that the security environment is going to change significantly. The North-South dispute, which has been tempered since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, might reemerge. Coupled with the crisis in Darfur and the ongoing contest over oil in Southern Kordofan, this has created a deadly cocktail of security concerns. The peace process might derail.

Sudan expert Alex van de Walle commented on the critical timing of this indictment in the BBC today, saying,

"In less than two years time, the people of South Sudan are expected to vote in a referendum on self-determination which has the potential, the likelihood indeed, of leading to the division of the country into two. And the first democratic elections in more than 20 years are expected this year. So it is already a pivotal turning-point in Sudan and there's a huge amount of political business that needs to be transacted if these two key events are to go ahead smoothly and without causing disruption and even a new war."

The long-term challenge for all actors inside Sudan will be to make sure the country does not return to war. Over the next few weeks it will be important to watch the reaction of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Darfur-based rebel group, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

The Chairman of the SPLM, Salva Kiir Mayardi, issued a statement Tuesday prior to the ICC's announcement. He emphasized that whatever the decision, Sudan will slowly move towards peace, saying,

"This matter may hang on for sometime but it certainly will not mean the end of our country, the Sudan or government. We must move beyond tomorrow. And we will move beyond tomorrow. This episode should not be viewed as a crisis but as an opportunity to consolidate peace, justice and stability in our country."

Sudanese Response

The Sudan Tribune reported that the Sudanese government expelled 10 NGOs from the country in response to the ICCs ruling. The government claimed the groups were "involved in collaboration with the ICC investigation in Darfur crimes." NGOs that were asked to leave include: Oxfam, CARE, MSF-Holland, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, the Norweigan Refugee Council, the International Rescue Committee, Action Contre la Faim, Solidarites, and CHF International.

Also today the people of Khartoum expressed their support of President Bashir in mass demonstrations. According to one American who has been living in Khartoum for the past two years, the government set up specially designed areas inside the capital for protests. Mr. Bashir has significant backing from his people in the North. One protester said, "Mr. Ocampo is crazy if he thinks he will take our president. He is a tool of the West to attack Sudan."

Bashir has also received support from other Arab nations like Egypt, as well as some African ones. Even Sudanese who do not support the president still object to the ICC's ruling. One resident of Khartoum said,

“The issue is not whether Omar al-Bashir is guilty or not, and by all means any individual that is responsible for genocide should be legally charged; but this is an internal affair in a sovereign country with a judicial system. If the international community is concerned about the situation in Darfur, they should be even more concerned about the safely and the stability of Sudan as a whole once such a warrant has been issued."

The Debate

President Bashir's indictment sparked a heated debate over the issue of future peace and security. The New York Times printed two opposing opinions before the ICC's decision was released. One opinion, written by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, supported the indictment. Tutu wrote that the indictment

"…presents a stark choice for African leaders — are they on the side of justice or on the side of injustice? Are they on the side of the victim or the oppressor? The choice is clear but the answer so far from many African leaders has been shameful."

Tutu asks African leaders to look at this indictment using their moral judgment.

But the security situation in Sudan is highly unstable, and Bashir is the key to keeping the peace. This is the argument that Franklin Graham of the Samaritan’s Purse and the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association has presented. In his article entitled, "Put Peace Before Justice" he writes,

"…arresting Mr. Bashir now threatens to undo the progress his country has made. In 2005, Sudan’s government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement signed an accord ending the civil war in the south. The agreement paved the way for elections in the south later this year, as well as for a referendum on southern independence scheduled for 2011. The accord has brought benefits to Sudan, but it isn’t clear that they will last. Mr. Bashir, who fought members of his own party to approve the deal, is critical to the peace process."

Additionally, Darfur remains a humanitarian disaster. The government, who has been accused of committing acts of genocide by the United States, is in the process of negotiating a solution.

What Next?

According to the American source, there is some dissension in the Bashir government, but it remains very quiet. Rumors have been circulating about a possible coup.

The next few months are going to be interesting. It is likely that the national elections will be postponed and negotiations with the Darfur rebels will end. If the ICC goes through with the court procedures, President Bashir will most likely be tried in absentia because the ICC does not have an enforcement mechanism. Instead, it has ordered the Sudanese government to turn Bashir in.