The Horn of Africa, as shown on the right, includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan (some scholars also include Kenya and Uganda in this list). Over the past few decades it has notoriously become known as one of the most conflict ridden areas in the world. Started by Aden Hasi Ayro it was originally the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), who took control of the government in the summer of 2006. American cruise missiles killed Ayro in May 2008. Shiekh Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman assumed Ayro’s position as top commander. Mukhtar Robow became the organization’s spokesman and leader of Al-Shabaab affiliates in the Bay and Bakool regions of south-central Somalia.
Extremist Ideology
Ayro and Robow have personal ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The two leaders trained in Afghanistan during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the group is ideological connected with al-Qaeda. The west, specifically the United States, is the primary source of contestation, corrupting the purity of Islam. All foreign occupiers, including the Ethiopians and the African Union, and the apostate moderates in the TFG, are seen as pawns of the west.
The bond between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab has grown close in the past year. In March 2009, the Defense Intelligence Agency predicted that a formal agreement between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda is “forthcoming.”
Al-Shabaab parted with moderate members of the ICU over a dispute regarding the implementation of Islamic law. It promotes a much stricter form of sharia law than the ICU introduced when it came to power. In areas of southern Somalia under their control, Al-Shabaab leaders have banned the popular narcotic khat and closed movie cinemas. They have also been flogging women in public, attacking humanitarian workers and civil society members and assassinating Somali politicians and police forces.
The organization’s activities thus far have been limited to within the borders of Somalia. Although it covets Al-Qaeda's ideology, Al-Shabaab's cause is more nationalist than internationalist. Its main target is the Somali government.
The organization’s activities thus far have been limited to within the borders of Somalia. Although it covets Al-Qaeda's ideology, Al-Shabaab's cause is more nationalist than internationalist. Its main target is the Somali government.
Expansion
During the Ethiopian occupation, Al-Shabaab fought as liberators and gained significant support from the Somali population. Anti-Ethiopian and anti-American sentiments grew. Thus, the group expanded rapidly, with hundreds of recruits “graduating” from their training camps annually.
According to U.S. intelligence analysts, new recruits continue to join because they seek an Islamic republic, not because they want to join the global terrorist network. Instead, they are joining a nationalist organization.
Recruits have included both Americans and Europeans that train alongside Somalis. One video released in earlier this month shows an American leading a group of fighters in the bush outside Mogadishu. One American, Shirwa Ahmed, killed 29 people in a suicide bombing last October.
Known Associations
Al-Shabaab is also affiliated with other Islamist groups in Somalia. Two of Ayro and Robow’s close associates, Hassan Turki and Hassan Dahir Aweys, led Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI), a violent Wahhabist organization that sought to spread Islamic rule throughout Somalia during the 1990s and early 2000s. Turki has close ties with Al-Shabaab, but is not considered a member of the organization. Aweys leads the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia-Asmara (ARS-A) and receives financial support from Eritrea.
Ayro and Robow have personal ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The two leaders trained in Afghanistan during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the group is ideological connected with al-Qaeda. The west, specifically the United States, is the primary source of contestation, corrupting the purity of Islam. All foreign occupiers, including the Ethiopians and the African Union, and the apostate moderates in the TFG, are seen as pawns of the west.
The bond between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab has grown close in the past year. In March 2009, the Defense Intelligence Agency predicted that a formal agreement between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda is “forthcoming.”
Popular Support Waning?
The United States' ability to deter the growth of Al-Shabaab is weak. However, several signs indicate that al-Shabaab’s support might be waning.[1] First, the organization has lacked a strong foreign occupier to direct the attacks of its jihad since the Ethiopian withdrawal in December 2008. AMISOM is not attempting to fight the insurgency like the Ethiopians did; instead, its mission is to conduct a peace support operation and establish a level of security in the absence a domestic military force.[2] This calls into question al-Shabaab’s claim that they continue to free Somalis from foreign occupiers.
Second, Islam in Somalia is relatively moderate and peaceful, with the exception of al-Shabaab. Many Somalis reject the style of rule that al-Shabaab has introduced in various towns and cities. In March 2009, popular protests against al-Shabaab’s strict laws on khat drew thousands of citizens from Kismayo and Baidoa into the streets.[3] Finally, the Somali population has negatively viewed the rise the brutal tactics adopted by al-Shabaab fighters. Kidnappings, assassinations and suicide bombs against humanitarian agencies, peace activists and businessmen have become very common.
The United States' ability to deter the growth of Al-Shabaab is weak. However, several signs indicate that al-Shabaab’s support might be waning.[1] First, the organization has lacked a strong foreign occupier to direct the attacks of its jihad since the Ethiopian withdrawal in December 2008. AMISOM is not attempting to fight the insurgency like the Ethiopians did; instead, its mission is to conduct a peace support operation and establish a level of security in the absence a domestic military force.[2] This calls into question al-Shabaab’s claim that they continue to free Somalis from foreign occupiers.
Second, Islam in Somalia is relatively moderate and peaceful, with the exception of al-Shabaab. Many Somalis reject the style of rule that al-Shabaab has introduced in various towns and cities. In March 2009, popular protests against al-Shabaab’s strict laws on khat drew thousands of citizens from Kismayo and Baidoa into the streets.[3] Finally, the Somali population has negatively viewed the rise the brutal tactics adopted by al-Shabaab fighters. Kidnappings, assassinations and suicide bombs against humanitarian agencies, peace activists and businessmen have become very common.
[1] Ken Menkhaus provides a good analysis of the al-Shabaab’s future and questions the foundation of their support among the Somali population in “Somalia After the Ethiopian Occupation: First steps to end the conflict and combat extremism,” The Enough Project, February 2009.
[2] AMISOM Mission Statement, AMISOM website http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/amisom.htm, accessed 6 April 2009.
[3] Mohamed Ahmed and Abdi Guled, “Somalis protest against al Shabaab, Kenyans taken,” Reuters, 25 March 2009.
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